Where the Streets Are Paved With Gold: Immigrants' Racial Attitudes in a Land of Inequality

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Abstract

This paper studies first-generation immigrants' attitudes toward Black Americans. Using a combination of original and publicly available surveys, I find that first-generation immigrants of all racial and ethnic groups display more negative attitudes toward Black Americans than do their native-born co-ethnics, which persist after controlling for demographics and partisanship. Using an original measure of optimism about the US, I find that immigrants have substantially higher levels of US optimism than native-borns. I use both mediation analysis and a survey experiment to show that differences in US Optimism are responsible for nativity-based differences in racial attitudes. These findings suggest that immigrants' negative attitudes toward Black Americans are a function of their strong belief in American opportunity and social mobility.

> *Immigration is by definition a gesture of faith in social mobility. It is the expression in action of a positive belief in the possibility of a better life.*
>
> John F. Kennedy

> *It doesn't matter anymore what shade the newcomer's skin is... There is virtually no movement up – for blacks or whites, established classes or arrivistes – that is not accompanied by race talk.*
>
> Toni Morrison

The percentage of immigrants in the US population hit 14.1% in 2021, approaching 1890's all-time high of 14.8% (Jordan and Gebeloff 2022). Today's immigrants are incorporating into a nation with record racial and ethnic diversity (Horowitz 2019). How do first-generation immigrants view race in America? How does the process of immigration and incorporation shape immigrants' perceptions of racial inequality?

For many immigrants, America is a land of opportunity. However, America is also a country of deep racial inequalities, especially between white and Black Americans (Charles 2003; Munger and Seron 2017; Reskin 2012; Sears and Savalei 2006). How do immigrants reconcile these two beliefs? I argue that first-generation immigrants are deeply invested in the idea of America as a land of opportunity, substantially more so than native-borns. This investment generates considerable cognitive dissonance between their positive attitudes toward America and their perception of racial inequality in the US. To reduce this dissonance, they are more likely to derogate Black Americans and attribute racial inequality to Black Americans' perceived shortcomings.

Using a combination of publicly available and original surveys of white non-Latino, Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents, I find that first-generation immigrants of all four groups show substantially higher levels of racial resentment and more anti-Black attitudes than do their second and third+ generation co-ethnics. These attitudinal gaps replicate consistently for all

racial/ethnic groups of immigrants across multiple questions and surveys and remain large and statistically significant even after controlling for demographics and partisanship. Immigrant attitudes toward Black Americans are uniquely negative. First-generation immigrants show more positive attitudes toward Latinos, Asian Americans, and white Americans than native-borns.

To explain nativity-based gaps in immigrant attitudes, I develop an original measure of US and native-country optimism. Using this measure, I find that immigrants have much more positive views of the US than of their native country and much more positive views of the US than do their native-born co-ethnics. I use causal mediation analysis to show that nativity-based differences in US Optimism mediate first-generation immigrants' unusually negative attitudes toward Black Americans. First-generation immigrants and native-borns of the same racial/ethnic group with similar levels of US Optimism have similar racial attitudes.

Finally, I conduct a survey experiment to test the relationship between US Optimism and racial attitudes among both immigrants and native-borns. Respondents were assigned to read a prime about a Guatemalan immigrant who started a trucking business in the US and either succeeded (Optimism Prime) or failed (Pessimism Prime). Respondents exposed to the Optimism Prime were significantly more optimistic about the US, had higher racial resentment scores, and believed that discrimination against Blacks, Latinos, and immigrants in the US was less frequent than respondents exposed to the Pessimism Prime.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the extant research on immigrant racial attitudes. The following section develops a theory of first-generation migration experiences and their impact on immigrant optimism and racial attitudes. The third section describes the survey data used. The fourth section describes nativity effects across a variety of racial attitudes. The fifth section presents estimates of immigrants' and native-borns' optimism about the US (and for immigrants of their country of origin). The sixth section uses mediation analysis and a survey experiment to test the relationship between nativity, optimism about the US, and racial attitudes. The final section is the conclusion.

What We Know About Immigrants' Racial Attitudes

Scholars have paid substantial attention to the attitudes of native-borns towards immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Masuoka and Junn 2013), including the role that racial attitudes play in native-borns' anti-immigrant sentiment (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008; Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013). Scholars have also studied processes of immigrant incorporation into the political system more broadly, such as the effect of nativity and generation on party ID acquisition (Wong 2000; Hajnal and Lee 2006; Just 2019; Hopkins et al. 2020), political socialization (Jones-Correa 1998; Dalisay 2012; Wong and Tseng 2008; White et al. 2008; Callahan and Muller 2013), political participation (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Barreto 2005; White 2016; Wong 2008; Ramakrishnan 2005; Stoll and Wong 2007; Junn 1999; Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001), and ethnic identification (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Jones-Correa et al. 2018; Rumbaut 1994).

This paper seeks to address a critical gap at the intersection of these two literatures - how do immigrants' attitudes towards Black Americans differ from native-borns, and what causes these differences? Immigrants' understanding of the American racial context is essential to the acculturation process and to how they experience the United States. Anti-Black attitudes have a profound impact on native-borns' political affiliations (Craig and Richeson 2014; Schaffner, MacWilliams and Nteta 2016; Tesler 2013), political participation (Enos 2016; Knuckey and Kim 2015), and policy preferences (Banks 2014; Tesler 2012; Gilens 2009). Understanding immigrants' racial attitudes is key to understanding their incorporation into American social and political life.

Several political science, psychology, and sociology studies have touched on questions of immigrants' anti-Black attitudes. Using semi-structured interviews of Afro-Caribbean immigrants in New York City, Rogers (2006) finds that first-generation Afro-Caribbean immigrants express limited racial group consciousness, have relatively low concern about discrimination, and hold substantial levels of stereotypes about African-American laziness. Waters (1999) also interviews

Afro-Caribbean immigrants and finds they express highly antagonistic attitudes toward native-born Black Americans. Zamora (2016) uses interviews with Mexicans in the U.S. and Mexico to illustrate the phenomenon of "racial remittances," where Mexican immigrants to the U.S. acquire anti-Black attitudes while in the U.S. and then transmit those attitudes to family and friends abroad. Marrow (2009) interviews recent Latino immigrants to the U.S. and finds that they actively distance themselves from Black Americans in an attempt to raise their group's social status. McClain et al. (2006) uses survey data and finds that Latino immigrants in the South express more negative attitudes toward Black Americans than do southern white (non-Latino) Americans. Robertson and Roman (2023) finds that more acculturated Latinos who are more worried "that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons" are also more sympathetic to Black Americans. Several other quantitative studies also identify heightened levels of anti-Black prejudice among Latinos (Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Segura and Valenzuela 2010), but these studies do not examine differences in nativity as a driver of anti-Black attitudes. Some of the best quantitative evidence about immigrants' racial attitudes comes from a growing literature on Asian Americans. Using the CCES, Tokeshi (2021) finds that foreign-born Asian Americans have more anti-Black prejudice than native-borns, arguing that the difference is due to native-born Asian Americans' increased social contact with racially liberal whites. Yi and Todd (2021), on the other hand, argues that the internalization of the model minority myth is responsible for greater anti-Blackness among Asian Americans.

While these studies provide valuable contributions to the study of immigrants' attitudes, they tend to share two features that substantially limit their ability to comprehensively explain nativity-based differences. First, many of these studies lack clear comparisons between the racial attitudes of immigrant and comparable native-born groups. Some of these studies are also interview-based and contain a relatively small sample size (n of fewer than 50 interviews). In many qualitative interview studies on this topic, interviews are only conducted with foreign-borns, limiting the ability to compare their answers to those of native-born coethnics. While this approach allows for a rich and nuanced understanding of the interview participants' experiences, it limits the ability to

make quantitative comparisons between the two groups. Furthermore, the small sample size also means that a small number of unusual interview respondents can substantially shift the results in a non-representative direction.

Second, these studies tend to do a deep dive into the experiences of only one racial or ethnic group (such as Afro-Caribbeans in Rogers (2006), Mexican-Americans in Zamora (2016) and Asian Americans in Tokeshi (2021)). While this approach has notable strengths, it can obscure the similarities between different groups of immigrants. For example, both the social context explanation put forth by Tokeshi (2021) and the internalized model minority explanation put forth by Yi and Todd (2021) are unique to Asian Americans and are difficult to apply to the other three racial/ethnic groups that show similar nativity effects in racial attitudes. While first-generation immigrants' race and ethnicity profoundly shape their experiences in the U.S., they can also share commonalities in their migration experiences that can consistently influence their racial attitudes.

This study aims to quantitatively compare different immigrant and native-born groups' racial attitudes. I develop a theory that explains first-generation immigrants' differences in racial attitudes as a direct result of their migration experiences rather than as a product of factors unique to specific racial or ethnic groups of immigrants.

How Migration Experiences Shape Racial Attitudes

In this paper, I focus on the differences between first-generation immigrants and native-born Americans, where the latter category also includes second-generation immigrants. While second-generation immigrants have unique experiences relative to their third-plus-generation peers (Carlos 2021; Portes and Zhou 1993), first-generation immigrants have distinctive experiences that set them apart from their native-born co-ethnics. Immigration, whether involuntary (as a child) or by active choice (as an adult), is a major life-shaping event with substantial social and psychological consequences for immigrants. As a result, first-generation immigrants are likely to

share political beliefs shaped by their immigration experiences that differ from the views of even second-generation immigrants. I argue that first-generation immigrants are unique for three reasons: selection, socialization, and sacrifice.

Scholars have found substantial selection effects in the kinds of people who choose to migrate to the US (Gobillon and Solignac 2015; Kennedy et al. 2006). Immigrants tend to be healthier (Vang et al. 2015), better educated (Cañibano and Woolley 2015), and generally come from more advantaged backgrounds (Feliciano 2020) than non-migrants from their country of origin. Migrating to a new country is risky, so immigrants are likely to be more entrepreneurial than the average person from their native country (Vandor and Franke 2016). This selection effect can explain immigrants' successes in scientific and technological innovation (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010), and business (Dabić et al. 2020).

This paper focuses on a different form of selection - would-be migrants' attitudes toward the receiving country. Attitudes toward the US differ dramatically both between and within countries (Morgenstern and Bohigues 2021; Steinberg 2015; Chiozza 2007). However, people with negative attitudes toward the US are less likely to migrate there than people with positive attitudes. As a result, the average immigrant arrives in the US with favorable views of American institutions and American opportunity (Michelson 2003). Immigrants' native-born co-ethnics do not undergo the same selection process, potentially leading to lower optimism toward America.

Socialization is a second unique factor shaping first-generation immigrants' political attitudes. While the migration process may select for specific types of people, immigrants also have very different experiences than their US-born counterparts. First-generation immigrants have had experiences in their country of origin with which to compare the United States. They may have also been socialized into specific depictions of the United States by American and local media without the first-hand experiences of native-borns.

Some scholars have argued that first-generation immigrants experience a "Dual frame of reference" with respect to the US and their country of origin (Ogbu 1987, 2014). First-generation

immigrants can compare their country of origin and the receiving country in a way native-borns cannot. While some scholars argue that a dual frame of reference can also apply to later generations, the ability to directly compare experiences between two countries is unique to first-generation immigrants, especially those who immigrated as teenagers or adults. In some cases, this also means that when first-generation immigrants think about their social position within the United States, their comparison group is in their country of origin rather than among native-born Americans (Ogbu 1991).

Furthermore, native-born Americans' party identification and political attitudes are substantially shaped by their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1978; Achen 2002; Tyler and Iyengar 2022) and their schools (Langton and Jennings 1968; Kahne, Crow and Lee 2013). While immigrants, especially those who immigrate as children, may have some political socialization into the American system from similar sources (Humphries, Muller and Schiller 2013), scholars have documented the outsized role of media narratives in shaping immigrants' beliefs about America (Liu and Gastil 2014). Scholars have noted how television reinforces perceptions about America as a land of opportunity, where hard work will result in the attainment of the American Dream (Kim 2019).

The final difference between immigrants and their native-born co-ethnics is that of sacrifice. While immigrants feel positively toward their host country, migration involves leaving family, friends, and their native culture. Scholars have extensively documented the psychological hardships of migration (Finch and Vega 2003; Mui and Kang 2006; Oh, Koeske and Sales 2002; Arbona et al. 2010). These sacrifices are likely to influence how immigrants think about their host countries. Cognitive dissonance theory finds that people who undergo effort to achieve a goal ultimately value that goal substantially more than those who achieve it easily (Aronson and Mills 1959; Alessandri et al. 2008). Scholars have documented this "effort justification" paradigm in a variety of situations, from hazing (Aronson and Mills 1959) to weight loss (Axsom and Cooper 1985), to interpersonal relationships (Aumer et al. 2016), to consumer shopping habits (Norton,

Mochon and Ariely 2012).

In the context of immigration, effort justification suggests that immigrants will feel more positively about their host country than native-borns, especially if they (1) consciously decide to leave their country of origin and (2) make substantial sacrifices as part of migration. Age at migration is a key variable correlated with both of these factors. Immigrants who migrated when they were under 18 were unlikely to have consciously decided to leave their native country. Young adults were likely to make the decision to immigrate, but immigrants who moved in middle age or older were more likely to leave extended families, friends, and established careers as part of their move. They also were more likely to have to expend more effort to acculturate to their new country than people who moved as children or young adults (Berry 1992; Diwan, Jonnalagadda and Balaswamy 2004; Oh, Koeske and Sales 2002).

For these three reasons, first-generation immigrants are likely to hold substantially more optimistic views about the United States than their second and third+ generation coethnics. However, this view of America as a land of opportunity clashes with the realities of racial inequality in the US, especially with respect to inequality between Black and white Americans. Both Black and white Americans are overwhelmingly native-born and do not face the economic, social, and linguistic hardships new immigrants face. Yet there are substantial racial inequalities between Black and white Americans in virtually every life outcome (Charles 2003; Munger and Seron 2017; Reskin 2012). In many ways, Black Americans occupy an “exceptional" status in American politics relative to other Americans, including immigrants of color (Sears and Savalei 2006). How do immigrants reconcile the dissonance between their optimism and American reality?

I argue that immigrants reduce the dissonance between their deeply held positive views of America and the realities of racial inequality by derogating Black Americans. Cognitive dissonance theory argues that having two contradictory beliefs creates psychological discomfort. The discomfort of this dissonance provides a powerful drive toward internal consistency and a strong motive to reconcile any contradictory beliefs (Festinger 1962). Scholars find that the more deeply

held a belief, the more likely it is to "win" the battle between two contrasting beliefs in a dissonance reduction situation (Kunda 1990). While some native-borns also engage in similar dissonance reduction strategies, immigrants, who are deeply invested in American opportunity, are thus more likely to reduce dissonance by derogating Black Americans rather than by attenuating their positive beliefs about the US. This theory has several implications tested in this paper.

First, the theory predicts that first-generation immigrants of all racial/ethnic groups will have more negative attitudes toward Black Americans than their second or third+ generation co-ethnics. Regardless of race/ethnicity, first-generation immigrants have unique migration experiences not shared with their second-generation co-ethnics. On the other hand, if there is substantial heterogeneity in nativity effects between different immigrant groups, where some immigrant groups feel more positively toward Black Americans than do their native-born co-ethnics would be substantial evidence against this theory.

Second, immigrants' negative attitudes should be unique to perceptions of Black Americans. First, anti-Black racism is unique relative to other forms of racial prejudice in the U.S. Unlike other racial and ethnic groups that have experienced prejudice in the United States, the ancestors of many Black Americans were subject to chattel slavery and the laws, stereotypes, and social constructs created to justify and later to excuse enslavement, which continue to have consequences for Black Americans today. This history has led to a persistent "color line" different from the difficulties experienced by other people of color (Sears and Savalei 2006). Second, the vast majority of Black Americans are native-born (91%), and most have had families in the U.S. for many generations. The same is not true for Asian Americans (33% native-born) and Latino Americans (66% native-born). The long-standing inequalities between Black Americans and White Americans can look different through the eyes of first- and second-generation Americans than their own and other immigrant groups' struggles for acceptance.

Third, first-generation immigrants will have more positive attitudes toward the US than their second and third+ generation co-ethnics. First-generation immigrants will see racial discrimi-

nation in the United States as less serious than their native-born co-ethnics. More importantly, they will rate the United States more positively than native-borns on questions without an explicit race/ethnicity component (US Optimism), such as social mobility, political efficacy, and the rule of law. These differences in Optimism about the US will explain nativity-based gaps in racial attitudes.

Survey Data

I draw on survey data to measure immigrants' and native-borns' racial attitudes among white non-Latino, Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents.

The data on immigrants' racial attitudes analyzed in this paper comes from seven surveys. Five of these surveys are nationally representative samples from publicly available datasets: the American National Election Studies (ANES), the Cooperative Election Study 2018 survey (CES, formerly CCES[1]), the CES 2020 survey, the CES 2022 survey, and the General Social Survey (GSS). The other two surveys are original surveys run by the author using the Lucid platform. Table 1 provides detailed information about each survey.

Original Survey I aimed to measure the US Optimism variable and test the relationship between optimism and racial attitudes among immigrants and native-borns. Original Survey II was designed as a survey experiment. Respondents were exposed to a prime meant to increase or decrease optimism about the US. Due to data limitations, Original Survey II was conducted on Latino and Asian respondents only[2]. I present the results of Original Survey I alongside the nationally representative survey results. Original Survey II results are presented in the "Survey Experiment" section of the results and Appendix B.4.1.

[1] I treat the three CES datasets as separate surveys because of their size and because they contain different racial attitudes questions

[2] Due to a data collection error in Original Survey II, only a subset of demographic covariates (including race/ethnicity and nativity) were collected

People from the United States define whiteness, Blackness, *Latinindad*, and other racial/ethnic classifications in distinctive ways. Not all countries/cultures use the same racial definitions (Clealand 2022). To ensure that I am comparing native-borns and immigrants of comparable backgrounds, I examine the countries of origin of the survey respondents in Original Survey I. In Appendix A.2, I present a table that includes immigrants' countries of origin and racial self-definitions. I find that immigrants primarily identify in ways consistent with US-based racial classifications. Among white immigrants, 81.2% hail from Europe, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. 65.1% of Black immigrants were born in Africa or the Caribbean, and an additional 15.3% were born in Europe/Canada/Australia/New Zealand. Among non-Black Latino immigrants, 80.6% come from Latin America, with an additional 8.9% from the Caribbean. Finally, 90% of Asian immigrants were born in Asia.

While the ANES and the GSS are administered in English and Spanish, all other surveys are in English only. The ANES is administered to citizens only, which excludes the least acculturated immigrants. As a result, except for Spanish-speaking non-citizens immigrants on the GSS, all immigrants surveyed in this project are at least moderately acculturated to the US. In Appendix A.3, I plot first-generation immigrant respondents' answers to acculturation questions and find they tend to be at least moderately acculturated.

Despite these limitations, there is reason to believe that at least some of the conclusions of this project apply to poor and less acculturated immigrants as well. First, scholars using interview-based methodologies have documented substantial levels of anti-Blackness among immigrants, including those who are poor and less acculturated. For example, most immigrant participants interviewed in Marrow (2009) were undocumented - however, they still expressed highly anti-Black attitudes. Similarly, working-class Afro-Caribbean fast food workers interviewed by Waters (1999) also described Black Americans as lazy and undisciplined. 62% of Russian immigrants interviewed for Goldenberg and Saxe (1996) had been in the US for less than seven years, and the interviews were conducted in Russian. Many were not employed. These immigrants also

Table 1: Characteristics of the Survey Datasets

Survey	ANES	GSS	Original I	Original II
Dates	2012 - 2020	2010 - 2018	2021	2023
# Native-born	15,882	9,963	1,120*	958*
# Foreign-born	1,517	1,579	943*	560*
Foreign-born Race/Ethnicity†	W:404 B:134 L:661 A:318	W:385 B:189 L:742 A:263	W:255 B:203 L:228 A:257	L:262 A:298
Survey Languages	English, Spanish	English, Spanish	English	English
Target Population	Citizens 18+	All 18+	All 18+	Asians and Latinos 18+
Racial Resentment Measure	All	Subset	All	All
Stereotypes	Hardworking	Hardworking	Hardworking	Hardworking
Attributions for Inequality Measure	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Racism Prevalence Measure	Group Discrim	No	No	Group Discrim

Survey	CES (2018)	CES (2020)	CES (2022)
Dates	2018	2020	2022
# Native-born	53,389	53,774	52,382
# Foreign-born	4,017	4,317	3,778
Foreign-born Race/Ethnicity†	W:1517 B:448 L:1215 A:837	W:1662 B:632 L:1153 A:870	W:1376 B:642 L:1021 A:739
Survey Languages	English	English	English
Target Population	All 18+	All 18+	All 18+
Racial Resentment Measure	All	Subset	Subset
Stereotypes	None	None	None
Attributions for Inequality Measure	No	No	No
Racism Prevalence Measure	Racial Problems Rare	Racial Problems Rare	Racial Problems Rare

† W = White non-Latino; B = Black, incl Black Latino; H = non-Black Latino; A = Asian
* Only includes those who passed the attention check

had extremely anti-Black views. These studies suggest anti-Black attitudes are not limited to acculturated or higher-status immigrants.

Second, the demographic differences between the immigrants sampled in my surveys and the immigrant population in the US, as measured by Pew's tabulations of the American Community Survey, are not overwhelming. Figure 1 Panel A plots the proportion of immigrant respondents by educational achievement for six surveys I use and the relevant proportions on the ACS[3]. Figure 1 Panel B plots the same statistic by approximate income quintile.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these plots. First, the surveys tend to reasonably approximate educational distributions for three of the four immigrant groups. While all four surveys somewhat oversample the number of college graduates for Black, White, and Asian immigrants, the differences are not overwhelming. However, the same cannot be said for survey estimates of Latino immigrants. Except for the GSS, the four other surveys seriously undersample Latino immigrants without a high school education. On this measure, the GSS performs well. For the CES and original survey, the discrepancy is most likely because the survey is English-only, while for the ANES, it is likely the result of the citizens-only design.

Second, while all surveys do a decent job at sampling across the income distribution, unsurprisingly, all oversample poorer immigrants relative to wealthier ones. Undersampling of more affluent respondents is a common problem in online survey research (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012), as wealthier potential respondents are less likely to respond to the financial incentives survey companies use to acquire respondents. The GSS does the best job sampling wealthier White and Asian immigrants but has the greatest oversample of poorer Latino respondents. The other surveys perform very similarly to one another on this variable.

Third, the GSS provides the most accurate sampling of immigrants based on their educational status, whereas the other three show deficiencies in their sample of lower-education Latino

[3]Pew does not provide tabulations by race/ethnicity but by region of origin. As a result, I estimate race/ethnicity by aggregating by region of origin (e.g., European is counted as White, Mexican counted as Latino and so on)

Figure 1: Survey Distributions versus Baseline ACS

A) Education



B) Income



Notes: Figure shows the distributions of immigrant respondents by education and income across all four surveys, and compares them to statistics from the American Communities Survey (ACS), which is conducted as part of the Census. The surveys used in this book over-represent educated immigrants. These differences are slight in the case of white, Black, and Asian immigrants, but large in the case of Latino immigrants (with exception of the GSS). The surveys also tend to over-represent poorer immigrants, and under-represent wealthier ones.

immigrants. However, despite this substantial difference, as I show later, the results from the GSS do not differ dramatically from those of other surveys. This consistency is especially important for Latino immigrants, where the GSS has the biggest representativeness advantage over the other surveys.

These distributions do not suggest that the surveys used in this study only sample the most privileged immigrants. However, even if these findings only apply to more acculturated immigrants, this analysis provides a valuable study of the role of acculturation on immigrants' racial attitudes. If even very acculturated immigrants have high levels of anti-Blackness, this suggests that greater familiarity with American culture does not erase immigrants' anti-Blackness.

Measuring Racial Attitudes

I use four sets of questions to measure racial attitudes. Not all questions were available on all surveys. Table 1 describes which of these measures were available on which survey.

Racial Resentment: The first measure of anti-Black attitudes I use is the racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sears 1981). Not every publicly available survey I use asks all four racial resentment questions. When comparing surveys, I focus on the full scale where it is available and the question that is most commonly asked across all surveys. While only four of the seven surveys contain the full racial resentment scale, all seven contain the following agree/disagree question:

> *Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors* (**Work Way Up**)

Kam and Burge (2018) suggests that the Racial Resentment measure is best considered a measure of structural versus individual attributions for Black-white racial inequality among respondents of all racial groups. However, (Feldman and Huddy 2005) finds that racial resentment

correlates strongly with overt racial prejudice among white liberals but not among white conservatives. As a result, I include additional measures in my analysis to create a clearer image of immigrants' racial attitudes.

Attributions for Inequality: The General Social Survey includes a question that more overtly measures negative attitudes towards Black Americans. While the racial resentment measure is designed, in part, to reduce social desirability bias, the Attributions for Inequality question on the GSS is more upfront. It reads:

> ***On the average Blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are... [select all that apply]***
>
> ☐ *Mainly due to discrimination* (**AFI - Discrimination**)
>
> ☐ *Because most Blacks have less in-born ability to learn*
>
> ☐ *Because most Blacks don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty*
>
> ☐ *Because most Blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty* (**AFI - Motivation**)

This question allows respondents to choose one or more reasons to explain Black-White economic differences. It includes an option that corresponds to racial resentment (lack of motivation/willpower) and an option closer to Old Fashioned Racism (in-born differences). It also includes a non-prejudiced option (mainly discrimination) and a more ambiguous option (lack of opportunity for education).

Negative Stereotypes: The third set of measures is about stereotypes. I focus on the "hard-working" vs. "lazy" stereotype. Respondents are asked to rate on a scale of 1-7 whether people in a racial/ethnic group are hardworking or lazy. I use this question to directly compare immigrant

and native-born attitudes about Black and non-Black racial/ethnic groups. The survey question wording in Original Survey I is slightly different than in the other surveys (see Appendix A.1.1).

Prevalence of Racism: Finally, I measure immigrants' beliefs about the prevalence of racial discrimination in the United States using two sets of questions.

The first question, asked on the three CES surveys only, measures the degree to which respondents agree with the following statement:

> *Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations* **(Racism Rare)**

Agreement with the statement suggests that the respondent sees America as a mostly color-blind society, where racism is a rare exception to an egalitarian norm.

The second set of questions, asked on the ANES and the Original II survey, examines perceived discrimination against different groups in the US. Like the previous question, this question helps understand immigrants' perceptions of the broader American racial context. Do immigrants view discrimination against Black Americans as rarer than native-borns? If immigrants view America as a more racially harmonious society, they should see discrimination against all groups as less common than should native-borns.

> ***For each of the following groups, how much discrimination is there in the United States today? [A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all]***
>
> - *Blacks*
> - *Hispanics*
> - *Asians*
> - *Whites*
> - *Immigrants* [Original II survey only]

Results: Immigrants View Black Americans Negatively

How do immigrants and native-borns differ in their views of Black Americans? To answer this question, I estimate a model of the following form separately for each of the four racial/ethnic groups of respondents:

$$DV \sim First\ Gen + Second\ Gen + Age + Gender + Education + Income + Party\ ID$$

First and second-generation are dummy variables that are coded as 1 when the respondent is a first- or second-generation immigrant, respectively. I estimate this model on data from six different surveys (not all dependent variables are available on all surveys), and I also present estimates from pooled data[4]. I estimate this model separately for each racial/ethnic group of respondents to test whether all four groups have a consistent nativity effect on racial attitudes. A consistent nativity effect across all four groups would suggest something unique about the migration process that leads to a distinctive first-generation effect. Pooling data across all racial/ethnic groups and adding a race/ethnicity control variable yields substantively identical results (see Appendix B.1.2)

In Figure 2, I plot the coefficient on the first-generation dummy variable for four dependent variables: Work Way Up, Racial Resentment, AFI - Discrimination, and AFI - Motivation. The figure illustrates a consistent first-generation effect. On most surveys, first-generation immigrants of all four racial/ethnic groups have higher levels of racial resentment, are more likely to attribute black-white inequality to Black Americans' perceived lack of motivation, and are less likely to attribute inequality to discrimination against Black Americans. In Appendix B.2, I plot the coefficient on the second-generation dummy variable and find no consistent differences between second-generation immigrants and their third+ generation co-ethnics. First-generation immigrants are unique in their attitudes toward Black Americans.

[4]The model for the pooled data also contains a variable for survey

Figure 2: First-Generation Immigrant vs Third+ Generation Racial Attitudes



Notes: first-generation immigrants feel more negatively toward Black Americans than do their third+ generation co-ethnics. Each panel represents the first-generation coefficients from regressions run on respondents from a specific racial/ethnic group. Points are estimates of the coefficient on the first-generation dummy variable. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Different colors represent different survey datasets. "Pooled" dataset contains data from all available datasets.

Figure 3: First-Generation Immigrant vs Third+ Generation Hardworking Ratings



Notes: first-generation immigrants rate Black Americans as less hardworking than do their third+ generation co-ethnics. However, there are no consistent nativity effects for ratings of other racial/ethnic groups. Each panel represents the first-generation coefficients from regressions run on respondents from a specific racial/ethnic group. Points are estimates of the coefficient on the first-generation dummy variable. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Different colors represent different survey datasets. "Pooled" dataset contains data from all available datasets. The GSS does not ask an Asian Hardworking question.

Figure 4: First-Generation Immigrant vs Third+ Generation Discrimination Perceptions



Notes: first-generation immigrants are more likely to believe that racial problems are rare and less likely to believe that racial discrimination is prevalent than do their third+ generation co-ethnics. Each panel represents the first-generation coefficients from regressions run on respondents from a specific racial/ethnic group. Points are estimates of the coefficient on the first-generation dummy variable. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Different colors represent different survey datasets. "Pooled" dataset contains data from all available datasets.

Do first-generation immigrants feel similarly toward non-Black racial/ethnic groups? In Figure 3, I apply the above model to the Hardworking stereotypes dependent variable for the four racial/ethnic groups. Once again, first-generation immigrants of all four racial/ethnic groups consistently express more negative attitudes toward Black Americans than their third+ generation coethnics. They are significantly less likely to rate Black Americans as hardworking than their third+ generation coethnics. These negative ratings are only applied to Black Americans - first-generation immigrants are no less likely to rate whites, Latinos, or Asians as hardworking. First-generation immigrants are consistently more likely to rate white Americans as hardworking than are their third+ generation coethnics. In Appendix B.2, I replicate this plot using the second-generation dummy variable and find no consistent differences in racial attitudes between second and third+ generation respondents. First-generation immigrants have uniquely negative attitudes toward Black Americans specifically, which do not spill over into their attitudes toward other groups.

Finally, to understand first-generation immigrants' perceptions of racial discrimination in the US, I plot my final set of dependent variables related to the perceived frequency of discrimination in the US. Once again, first-generation immigrants display very different attitudes than their third+ generation co-ethnics. First-generation immigrants of all four racial/ethnic groups are significantly more likely to agree with the statement, "Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations." They also believe that there is less discrimination in the US today against Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Whites than do their third+ generation co-ethnics. First-generation immigrants are likelier to see America as a colorblind society where racial discrimination is rare. In Appendix B.2, I replicate this plot for the second-generation dummy variable and find no consistent differences between second and third+ generation respondents.

In Appendix B.1.1, to demonstrate robustness to model specifications, I present the raw means between immigrants and native-borns for each set of variables. The results of the raw difference in means analyses mirror the findings in Figures 2 - 4. Regression models and compar-

isons of raw means show similar outcomes - first-generation immigrants tend to feel more negatively about Black Americans (and only Black Americans) and are more likely to believe that discrimination and racism are rare in the United States. First-generation immigrants are unique in these views. Both second and third+ generation respondents have significantly more positive attitudes toward Black Americans and are more likely to see discrimination as more common.

The consistency of first-generation effects across all four racial/ethnic groups is strong evidence that these effects result from the migration experience. Immigrants come from a wide variety of social contexts and have very different experiences within the United States. A white immigrant from Russia, a Black immigrant from Haiti, a Latino immigrant from Honduras, and an Asian immigrant from Taiwan all experienced dramatically different circumstances in their country of origin and are likely to experience very different treatment in the United States. Yet, relative to their native-born co-ethnics, they are all more likely to feel negatively toward Black Americans.

Immigrants are More Optimistic About the US

Why do first-generation immigrants have unique views about race in the United States? I argue that immigrants' heightened optimism about the United States is responsible for their negative beliefs about Black Americans. Immigrants, who are more likely to see America as a land of opportunity, are more likely to experience cognitive dissonance when confronted with Black-white racial inequality in the US. Due to their optimism about economic mobility in the United States, first-generation immigrants are more likely to reduce this dissonance by derogating Black Americans.

To test the effect of immigrant optimism about the US on their racial attitudes, I develop a measure of optimism about life in the US and for immigrants in their native country. The scale contains the following questions:

On a scale from 1-10, please rate how accurately each statement describes [country]

1. *Anyone who is willing to work hard can make a decent income*
2. *The legal system is fair and just*
3. *The political system is responsive to the needs of its citizens*
4. *It is a good place to live*

Immigrants were asked to rate both their native country (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$) and the US (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.85$) using this scale, while native-borns were only asked to rate the US (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.76$).

Figure 5 shows the means of US and native country optimism by nativity (first-generation immigrant vs. native-born) and by race/ethnicity. Immigrants are significantly more optimistic about the United States than are native-borns. They are also significantly more optimistic about the United States than are native-borns.

These differences are highly consistent across different racial/ethnic groups. First-generation immigrants of all four groups are significantly more optimistic than native-borns of all four groups. This consistency holds even when breaking the scale down into individual questions (see Appendix B.3.1). While there are some differences in optimism by race, they are substantially overshadowed by the nativity differences in optimism.

Figure 5: first-generation Immigrant and Native-Born Optimism (Original Survey I)



Notes: Plot shows mean optimism toward the US (first-generation immigrants and native-borns) and native country (first-generation immigrants only). Immigrants are more optimistic about the US than are native-borns. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6: US Optimism and Racial Resentment (Original Survey I)

Notes: Among immigrants and native-borns of all four racial/ethnic groups, there is a strong positive relationship between racial resentment and US Optimism.

Optimism Explains Nativity Differences in Racial Attitudes

First-generation immigrants score higher than their native-born co-ethnics in negative attitudes toward Black Americans and US Optimism. In this section, I examine the relationship between these two variables. First, I describe the relationship between US Optimism and racial attitudes among immigrants and native-borns. Then, I use mediation analysis and a survey experiment to demonstrate how first-generation immigrants' increased optimism about the US is responsible for their more negative attitudes toward Black Americans.

Figure 6 plots the relationship between US Optimism and Racial Resentment by nativity and race. For all racial/ethnic groups, there is a strong positive correlation between US Optimism and Racial Resentment. I replicate this analysis for all racial attitudes dependent variables in Appendix B.3.2 and find similarly strong relationships across all racial/ethnic and nativity groups. This relationship holds even after controlling for demographics and partisanship (see Appendix B.3.3).

On the other hand, among immigrants, there is no clear relationship between optimism about their country of origin and their racial attitudes. In Appendix B.3.4, I replicate the analysis in Figure 6 for immigrant ratings of their country of origin and find a clear null effect. Immigrants' ratings of the United States clearly correlate with their attitudes toward Black Americans, but their ratings of their native country do not.

Figure 7: Mediation Model



Figure 6 suggests that after controlling for US Optimism, first-generation immigrants and native-borns have similar levels of racial resentment. I test the relationship between immigrant optimism and racial attitudes in two ways: (1) using mediation analysis

on observational data from Original Survey I and (2) using a survey experiment from Original Survey II.

Mediation Analysis

First, I use mediation analysis to test whether nativity-based differences in US optimism mediate nativity-based differences in racial attitudes. Mediation analysis is used in social sciences to test potential explanations for how a variable (such as nativity) influences an outcome (such as racial attitudes). This analysis tests the degree to which the inclusion of a mediator variable in a regression reduces the effect of nativity on racial attitudes.

Mediation analysis is not a silver bullet - some scholars have highlighted the vulnerability of mediation analysis to confounders, especially with observational data (Bullock, Green and Ha 2010). Still, mediation is valuable for establishing statistical relationships between variables of interest (Preacher 2015; Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres 2018). If mediation analysis did not find that optimism about the US significantly mediates nativity effects on racial attitudes, this would be serious evidence against my theory.

Figure 7 shows the mediation model I use to measure the degree to which US Optimism explains nativity effects on racial attitudes. I argue that first-generation immigrant nativity increases US Optimism, creating more negative attitudes toward Black Americans.

Figure 8 shows the results of the mediation analysis for four key variables. In the case of the Workway, Racial Resentment, and AFI-Discrimination measures, US Optimism completely mediates the effect of immigrant nativity on racial attitudes. When accounting for the effect of nativity-based differences in US Optimism, the direct effect of immigrant nativity on racial attitudes is no longer significant. The AFI-Motivation and Black-White Hardworking (see Appendix B.4.2) dependent variables show a partial mediation effect. While nativity-based differences in US Optimism significantly mediate the effect of immigrant nativity on these attitudes, there is

Figure 8: US Optimism Mediates Nativity Effects on Racial Attitudes

Notes: US Optimism mediates nativity effects on racial attitudes. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 9: Survey Experiment Primes

Optimism Prime

Immigrant from Guatemala Builds Successful Trucking Business in the US

By Dorothy McMahon

Samuel Cruz came to America with 200$ in his pocket and the dream of starting his own business. "I did landscaping, I worked in restaurants. I worked washing trucks, I worked cleaning vegetables in supermarkets, I worked separating garbage in the landfill," he said.

After decades of scrimping and saving, Cruz's hard work paid off. "I started with one truck, and I grew it into an empire of trucks. We now have over a hundred trucks in the street and over 200 trailers." His company serves over 3000 accounts, including major companies like Amazon and UPS.

"Without America, where would I be?" Cruz said, "It gave me the opportunity to grow, the opportunity to become something."

Pessimism Prime

Trucking Business Started by Guatemalan Immigrant Fails

By Dorothy McMahon

Samuel Cruz came to America with 200$ in his pocket and the dream of starting his own business. "I did landscaping, I worked in restaurants. I worked washing trucks, I worked cleaning vegetables in supermarkets, I worked separating garbage in the landfill," he said.

But after decades of scrimping and saving, Cruz feels like he's farther away from the American Dream than when he started. "I decided to take a chance and open up my own business. I got my own truck, then had a bad accident that almost killed me".

"Now, I have all this debt and no truck." Cruz said, "I'm back to square zero. I don't know how much longer I can keep doing this."

still a significant direct effect of nativity even after accounting for US Optimism. To test the sensitivity of these results to unobserved confounders, I conduct a sensitivity analysis in Appendix A.4. These results suggest that nativity-based differences in racial attitudes result from nativity-based differences in optimism about the US.

Survey Experiment

While mediation analysis can provide valuable insights into the relationship between Nativity, Racial Attitudes, and US Optimism, it cannot establish causality. I conducted a survey experiment to test whether manipulating US Optimism can cause changes in racial attitudes among immigrants and native-borns[5].

[5]This study was pre-registered at AsPredicted: `https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=QTW_RRX`

Table 2: Survey Experiment US Optimism Manipulation Check

Group	Nativity	Optimism Prime	Pessimism Prime	Difference
Asian	Immigrant	7.42	6.17	1.25***
Asian	native-born	6.36	5.38	0.98***
Latino	Immigrant	7.17	6.24	0.93***
Latino	native-born	6.12	5.96	0.16

†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

In Original Survey II, respondents (n = 1,518) were assigned to read either a prime that was designed to either increase optimism about social mobility in the United States (Optimism Prime) or to decrease it (Pessimism Prime). The text/image for both primes is presented in Figure 9. Both primes contain similar details about a Guatemalan immigrant who started a trucking business in the United States. The first paragraph of both conditions is identical and establishes Samuel Cruz, the protagonist, as a hard worker trying to achieve the American Dream. In the Optimism Prime, Cruz's hard work pays off, and he builds a successful trucking business. In the Pessimism Prime, Cruz is badly derailed by a truck accident and is unable to build a successful business.

To test whether this treatment successfully primes US Optimism, I compare the US Optimism scores of the respondents who received the Optimism and Pessimism primes. Table 2 shows the US Optimism score for each set of respondents. For all four groups, respondents who read the Optimism prime had higher US Optimism scores than those who read the Pessimism prime, and for three groups, that difference was statistically significant.

In Table 3, I present the results of the survey experiment on the anti-Black attitudes and Frequency of Discrimination variables. Respondents in the Optimism Prime had higher Workway and Racial Resentment scores, were more likely to believe that discrimination against whites in the US is more frequent and less likely to believe in discrimination against Blacks, Latinos, and Immigrants in the US. While the data does not have sufficient power to adequately measure

subgroup effects, I present the results by nativity group and race/ethnicity in Appendix B.4.3. The treatment effects are highly consistent in magnitude among immigrants (n = 560) and native-borns (n = 958), and among Latinos (n = 766) and Asians (n = 752). Asians had a slightly larger treatment effect than Latinos, as expected from their stronger response to the Optimism prime, as described in Table 2. This evidence suggests that increasing US Optimism shapes immigrants' and native-borns' attitudes toward Black Americans and the American racial context.

US Optimism is associated with more negative attitudes toward Black Americans among immigrants and native-borns alike. Immigrants have significantly higher levels of US Optimism than their native-born co-ethnics, and these differences in US Optimism significantly mediate nativity effects on racial attitudes. Furthermore, using a survey experiment, I show that increasing US Optimism leads to higher racial resentment and less belief in discrimination against Blacks, Latinos, and immigrants among immigrants and native-borns alike. This is compelling evidence that immigrants' positive attitudes about the United States are responsible for their more negative attitudes toward Black Americans.

Table 3: Survey Experiment Results (All Respondents)

DV	**Optimism Prime**	**Pessimism Prime**	**Difference**
Anti-Black Attitudes			
Workway	3.35	3.15	0.20^{**}
Racial Resentment	2.94	2.82	0.12^{*}
AFI - Discrimination	0.51	0.55	0.04
AFI - Motivation	0.29	0.31	0.02
Discrimination against...			
Whites	2.27	2.10	0.17^{**}
Blacks	3.62	3.73	-0.11^{*}
Latinos	3.38	3.56	-0.18^{**}
Asians	3.27	3.33	-0.06
Immigrants	3.62	3.75	-0.13^{*}

$\dagger p<0.1$; $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

Conclusion

First-generation immigrants have distinctive life experiences, which translate into unique political attitudes. I find that first-generation immigrants have substantially more negative attitudes toward Black Americans than native-born Americans, including second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants' attitudes toward Black Americans are unique - they do not show similarly negative attitudes toward any other group. They are also more likely to believe that racial problems and racial discrimination in the US are rare.

These attitudes are the product of immigrants' heightened optimism about the United States. Due to the effort and sacrifice required of immigrants to come to the US, first-generation immigrants are inherently invested in the United States as a land of opportunity. As a result, when confronted with American racial inequality, immigrants are more likely than native-borns to respond by derogating Black Americans to reduce their cognitive dissonance.

I find that immigrants have substantially more optimism about the US than native-borns and that those differences in optimism mediate nativity-based differences in racial attitudes. Using a survey experiment, I find that manipulating US Optimism leads to more negative attitudes toward Black Americans and less belief in discrimination against Blacks, Latinos, and immigrants among native-borns and immigrants alike.

While these findings provide important insights into immigrants' political attitudes, several future avenues for research remain. First, the immigrants in this survey are relatively well-acculturated. To what degree does the US Optimism - racial attitudes link persist among less acculturated immigrants? Second, while immigrants have higher levels of US Optimism than their native-born co-ethnics, there is still substantial variance in the US Optimism measure. Which factors shape immigrant optimism about the US? Finally, US Optimism is a measure associated with political conservatism. How does US Optimism shape political participation, partisan identification, and immigrant vote choice?

Immigrants represent a rapidly growing part of the American population - and a growing part of the American electorate. Immigrant voting patterns have received heightened interest from scholars in the wake of the 2016 and 2020 elections. Understanding how immigrants view America and how these views shape their political beliefs is critical to understanding their choices at the ballot box.

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Contents

A Methodology

A.1 Surveys

A.1.1 Original I

The first original survey targeted 1,300 native-born and 1,000 foreign-born respondents. The foreign-born respondents were split into four groups by race/ethnicity, with approximately equal numbers of respondents per group. This breakdown was important, as my goal in this project is to uncover patterns of attitudes that are common across immigrant groups, rather than focusing on patterns unique to one specific group.

To ensure that my data was of high quality, I asked respondents for their birth year as an attention check. The Lucid panel includes pre-existing information on respondent demographics, including their age. In order for a respondent to be included in the dataset, their response to the birth year question had to be consistent with the age that was included in the Lucid demographics. This means that in order for them to have passed this attention check, they needed to have had the same answers both on Lucid's demographic survey and on my survey, two separate surveys which may have been administered weeks if not months apart. Approximately 90% of respondents in the original survey passed this attention check. There were no significant differences in pass rate between immigrants and native-borns. Re-running the analysis and including the attention check excluded respondents does not substantively alter the results.

Hardworking Stereotype Question Wording The original Hardworking Stereotype question that is asked on the ANES and GSS is worded as follows:

Now we have some questions about different groups in our society.
We're going to describe a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of '1' means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be 'hard-working.' A score of '7' means that you think most people in the group are 'lazy.' A score of '4' means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between.

On this scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means hard-working and 7 means lazy, where would you rate blacks in general on this scale?

On Original Survey I, I had planned to compare immigrant and native-born beliefs about native-born Americans and immigrants of the same race. As a result, the question about native-born Black Americans read. The hardworking question was reverted to the standard question in Original Survey II.

Do you think most Black Americans are more or less hard-working than most other Americans?
[Much more; Somewhat more; About the same; Somewhat less; Much less]

A.1.2 Original II

The second original survey targeted Latino and Asian immigrants and native-borns. I sought to survey the maximum number of immigrants available for each group.

To ensure that my data was of high quality, I used two attention checks after respondents read the article. The first attention check asked which country the immigrant in the story was from. The second attention check asked which business the immigrant in the story started. Respondents who answered both attention checks incorrectly were dropped from the analysis.

A.2 Immigrant Race by Country of Origin

Racial definitions in the US often do not neatly translate to racial definitions in other parts of the world. Here, I present data on the proportion of respondents of each of the four groups from Original Survey I by continent/region. I also present the raw number of respondents from each country that are grouped into the white, Black, Latino, and Asian categories. The overall categories that immigrants classify themselves into are generally consistent with their region of origin.

Table A1: Proportion of Immigrants of Each Group by Region of Origin

Region	**White**	**Black**	**Asian**	**Latino**
Africa	2.1	35.8	0.4	0
Anglosphere	31.6	4.8	1.4	1.6
Asia	7.4	12.2	90	4
Caribbean	0.4	29.3	0	8.9
Europe	49.6	10.5	1.8	3.6
Latin America	6.7	7.4	2.9	80.6
MENA	2.1	0	3.6	1.2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Notes:

Table A2: Percent of Immigrants of Each Group by Region of Origin (Part I)

Africa	**A**	**B**	**L**	**W**
Angola	0	1	0	2
Burkina Faso	0	15	0	0
Burundi	0	1	0	0
Cape Verde	0	2	0	0
Central African Republic	0	1	0	0
Republic of the Congo	0	3	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0	1	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	1	0	0
Ethiopia	0	3	0	0
Ghana	0	2	0	0
Kenya	0	5	0	0
Liberia	0	1	0	0
Malawi	0	1	0	0
Morocco	0	0	0	2
Nigeria	0	29	0	0
Mali	0	0	0	1
Senegal	0	2	0	0
Somalia	0	2	0	0
South Africa	0	1	0	1
Togo	0	1	0	0
Uganda	0	2	0	0
Tanzania	1	3	0	0
Zambia	0	2	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	3	0	0

Anglosphere	**A**	**B**	**L**	**W**
Australia	0	0	0	18
Canada	2	7	3	32
New Zealand	0	0	0	1
United Kingdom	2	4	1	38

Asia	**A**	**B**	**L**	**W**
Bangladesh	8	0	1	1
Cambodia	2	0	0	0
China	47	0	1	1
Hong Kong	15	0	0	0
India	56	26	3	1
Iran	0	0	0	3
Japan	18	1	0	6
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	2
Laos	2	0	0	0
Malaysia	1	0	0	1
Micronesia	0	0	0	1
Myanmar	1	0	0	0
Nepal	2	0	0	0
North Korea	0	0	0	1
Philippines	56	0	4	1
Singapore	2	0	0	1
South Korea	19	1	0	1
Sri Lanka	2	0	0	0
Thailand	8	0	0	0
East Timor	1	0	0	0
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	1
Vietnam	11	0	1	0

Caribbean	**A**	**B**	**L**	**W**
The Bahamas	0	3	0	1
Barbados	0	4	0	0
Dominica	0	1	1	0
Dominican Republic	0	2	15	0
Grenada	0	0	1	0
Haiti	0	13	0	0
Jamaica	0	33	1	0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0	1	0	0
Saint Lucia	0	1	0	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0	1	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0	8	4	0

Europe	**A**	**B**	**L**	**W**
Albania	0	2	1	1
Andorra	0	1	0	0
Armenia	0	2	0	4
Austria	0	0	0	3
Belarus	0	0	0	2
Belgium	0	0	0	3
Denmark	0	0	0	5
Finland	0	0	0	2
France	0	2	0	9
Georgia	0	2	0	0
Germany	2	9	1	33
Greece	0	0	0	6
Hungary	0	0	0	5
Iceland	0	3	0	0
Republic of Ireland	0	0	0	5
Italy	1	0	2	14
Latvia	0	0	0	1
Malta	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	0	2	1	4
Poland	0	0	0	7
Portugal	0	0	0	2
Romania	0	0	0	2
Russia	1	0	0	12
Serbia	0	0	0	1
Spain	0	0	3	1
Sweden	1	0	0	3
Switzerland	0	0	0	1
Turkey	0	1	1	4
Ukraine	0	0	0	9

MENA	**A**	**B**	**L**	**W**
Afghanistan	1	0	0	0
Egypt	1	0	2	1
Israel	0	0	0	3
Jordan	0	0	1	0
Pakistan	7	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	1	0	0	0
Syria	0	0	0	1
Yemen	0	0	0	1

Table A3: Percent of Immigrants of Each Group by Region of Origin (Part II)

	Latin America			
	A	**B**	**L**	**W**
Argentina	0	2	10	1
Belize	0	0	3	0
Brazil	0	1	5	4
Chile	0	1	2	0
Colombia	1	1	26	2
Costa Rica	0	1	3	0
Cuba	1	3	26	3
Ecuador	0	0	9	0
El Salvador	0	1	8	0
Guatemala	0	0	7	0
Guyana	4	2	0	0
Honduras	0	0	3	0
Mexico	0	5	62	3
Nicaragua	0	0	5	0
Panama	0	0	2	0
Peru	2	0	3	2
Uruguay	0	0	1	0
Venezuela	0	0	24	4

A.3 Immigrant Acculturation Questions and Data

To measure immigrant acculturation, I asked the following five questions. These questions are adapted from the Vancouver Index of Acculturation (Testa et al. 2019) and the Stephenson Multigroup Acculturation Scale (Stephenson 2000). Immigrants were asked to rate their agreement with the following statements on a scale from 1-10.

1. I feel comfortable speaking English

2. I believe in mainstream American values

3. I have or am interested in having American friends

4. I am informed about news and current events in the United States

5. I enjoy American entertainment (e.g. movies, music)

They are also asked similar statements about their native country.

1. I feel comfortable speaking my native language

2. I believe in the values of my native culture

3. I stay in close contact with friends and family members in my native country

4. I am informed about news and current events in my native country

5. I enjoy entertainment from my native country (e.g. movies, music)

On average, the immigrants in my sample have relatively high levels of US acculturation (around 8 on a scale of 10). In Figure A1, I plot the mean answer to each question by racial/ethnic group.

Though the mean answer is relatively high, there is still substantial variance among respondents. In the first panel of Figure A2, I plot a histogram of the full US acculturation measure for the four groups. In the second panel of Figure A2, I plot US acculturation - Native country acculturation. Here, I show that even though the majority of the respondents do feel closer acculturation to the US than their native country, there are still many respondents who feel closer to their native culture than the US.

Figure A1: Mean Acculturation



Notes: All groups show relatively high acculturation for both US and native country measures. On average, all groups show higher US acculturation on all questions except "cultural values".

Figure A2: US Acculturation Histograms

A) US Acculturation



B) Acculturation Difference



Notes: There is substantial variance in acculturation. While the mean value of US acculturation was high, some respondents were more attached to American culture than others (Panel A). Furthermore, when comparing acculturation to American culture vs the culture of their native country, a sizable proportion of respondents indicated they felt closer to the culture of their native country than to American culture (Panel B).

A.4 Mediation Sensitivity Analysis

Mediation analysis can be vulnerable to unobserved confounders. To test the degree to which my mediation results change under violations of the sequential ignorability assumption, I conduct a sensitivity analysis using the methodology presented in (Imai, Keele and Tingley 2010). The sensitivity parameter ρ at which ACME = 0 is between 0.17 and 0.35 for the three variables where immigrant nativity is associated with higher values of the DV and around -0.16 for the two variables where immigrant nativity is associated with lower values of the DV. This means that the mediation results presented here are moderately sensitive to violations of the sequential ignorability assumption.

Sensitivity analysis measures the strength of the relationship that a confounding variable would need to have with the mediator and outcome variables in order for the "true" mediation effect to be zero given the observed mediation effect. The bolded curve in each plot in Figure A3 represents how strong the relationship between the confounding variable and the outcome and mediator variables would need to be in order for ACME = 0. For example, for the Workway mediation analysis, if there is an omitted confounding variable that accounts for 40% of the residual variance in the outcome variable regression and 30% of the residual variance in the mediator regression, this would mean that the true mediation effect of US Optimism on the Workway variable is actually zero, and the observed mediation effect is just the result of omitted variable bias.

Figure A3: Mediation Sensitivity Analysis

Workway (ρ = 0.35)



Racial Resentment (ρ = 0.32)



AFI - Motivation (ρ = 0.17)



AFI - Discrimination (ρ = −0.16)



HW Diff (ρ = −0.16)



B Additional Results

B.1 Figure 2-4 Results Robustness to Model Specification

B.1.1 Difference in Means by Survey

In this section, I plot the raw Difference in Means between the first and thrid+ generation by DV for each of the four racial/ethnic groups. The Difference in Means analysis yields substantively identical results to Figures 2-4 in the body of the paper.

Figure A4: Difference in Means First - Third + Gen (Racial Attitudes)



Figure A5: Difference in Means First - Third + Gen (Hardworking)



Figure A6: Difference in Means First - Third + Gen (Discrimination Perceptions)



B.1.2 Regressions Pooled by Race/ethnicity

Here, I present regression tables from the following model:

DV ∼ *First Gen* + *Second Gen* + *Age* + *Gender* + *Education* + *Income* + *Party ID* + *RaceEth*

These results are substantively identical to the ones presented in Figures 2-4.

Table A4: Racial Resentment by Nativity

	Dependent variable:		
	Racial Resentment		
	ANES	Original I	CES 18
1st Gen	0.142*** (0.034)	0.189*** (0.051)	0.170*** (0.021)
2nd Gen	0.025 (0.029)	−0.151* (0.086)	0.007 (0.017)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	0.113** (0.053)	−0.002 (0.068)	0.074** (0.030)
Black	−0.412*** (0.027)	−0.391*** (0.061)	−0.421*** (0.016)
Latino	0.072** (0.029)	0.037 (0.065)	0.018 (0.018)
Age	0.035*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.003)
Female	−0.039** (0.016)	−0.186*** (0.044)	−0.054*** (0.009)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	−0.043 (0.037)	0.007 (0.092)	0.011 (0.029)
Some College	−0.176*** (0.036)	−0.073 (0.087)	−0.194*** (0.029)
College Grad	−0.530*** (0.038)	−0.240*** (0.091)	−0.444*** (0.030)
Post Grad	−0.713*** (0.040)	−0.241** (0.101)	−0.623*** (0.031)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	0.456*** (0.028)	0.197*** (0.065)	0.631*** (0.015)
Lean Dem	0.184*** (0.029)	0.084 (0.080)	0.160*** (0.017)
Ind	0.796*** (0.029)	0.498*** (0.062)	1.093*** (0.015)
Lean Rep	1.254*** (0.030)	0.867*** (0.097)	1.814*** (0.017)
Weak Rep	1.208*** (0.030)	0.836*** (0.079)	1.553*** (0.017)
Strong Rep	1.476*** (0.026)	1.211*** (0.073)	1.916*** (0.014)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	2.641*** (0.048)	2.314*** (0.108)	2.139*** (0.034)
Observations	14,132	2,108	43,371
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Work Way Up by Nativity

	Dependent variable:		
	Workway		
	ANES	GSS	Original I
1st Gen	0.225*** (0.043)	0.184*** (0.043)	0.295*** (0.069)
2nd Gen	0.040 (0.037)	0.150** (0.068)	−0.054 (0.118)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	0.153** (0.067)	0.094 (0.074)	0.093 (0.092)
Black	−0.319*** (0.034)	−0.307*** (0.036)	−0.208** (0.083)
Latino	0.091** (0.036)	−0.023 (0.042)	0.049 (0.089)
Age	0.072*** (0.006)	0.077*** (0.007)	0.070*** (0.018)
Female	0.013 (0.020)	−0.023 (0.024)	−0.265*** (0.060)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	−0.037 (0.047)	−0.087** (0.043)	−0.002 (0.124)
Some College	−0.215*** (0.045)	−0.279*** (0.044)	−0.116 (0.118)
College Grad	−0.610*** (0.048)	−0.756*** (0.048)	−0.346*** (0.123)
Post Grad	−0.845*** (0.050)	−0.890*** (0.050)	−0.225* (0.136)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	0.462*** (0.035)	0.409*** (0.041)	0.038 (0.089)
Lean Dem	0.189*** (0.036)	0.285*** (0.044)	−0.047 (0.109)
Ind	0.817*** (0.037)	0.710*** (0.041)	0.359*** (0.085)
Lean Rep	1.307*** (0.038)	1.117*** (0.048)	0.804*** (0.132)
Weak Rep	1.250*** (0.038)	1.101*** (0.045)	0.700*** (0.108)
Strong Rep	1.540*** (0.033)	1.345*** (0.047)	1.156*** (0.099)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	2.744*** (0.060)	2.973*** (0.068)	3.037*** (0.147)
Observations	14,183	10,653	2,120

	Dependent variable:		
	Workway		
	CES 18	CES 20	CES 22
status1st Gen	0.332*** (0.025)	0.198*** (0.029)	0.258*** (0.032)
status2nd Gen	0.066*** (0.021)	0.038 (0.024)	0.060** (0.026)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	0.117*** (0.037)	0.192*** (0.040)	0.074* (0.044)
Black	−0.386*** (0.020)	−0.298*** (0.020)	−0.386*** (0.020)
Latino	0.049** (0.023)	0.056** (0.026)	0.016 (0.028)
Age	0.081*** (0.003)	0.102*** (0.004)	0.099*** (0.004)
Female	−0.042*** (0.011)	−0.052*** (0.013)	−0.107*** (0.014)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	0.006 (0.036)	−0.021 (0.056)	0.050 (0.051)
Some College	−0.232*** (0.036)	−0.326*** (0.055)	−0.240*** (0.050)
College Grad	−0.509*** (0.036)	−0.446*** (0.056)	−0.358*** (0.051)
Post Grad	−0.718*** (0.038)	−0.591*** (0.056)	−0.479*** (0.052)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	0.658*** (0.019)	0.532*** (0.020)	0.619*** (0.021)
Lean Dem	0.163*** (0.020)	0.141*** (0.019)	0.127*** (0.021)
Ind	1.134*** (0.019)	0.870*** (0.021)	0.896*** (0.023)
Lean Rep	1.818*** (0.021)	1.858*** (0.029)	1.758*** (0.031)
Weak Rep	1.599*** (0.020)	1.655*** (0.027)	1.606*** (0.027)
Strong Rep	1.948*** (0.017)	1.864*** (0.024)	1.778*** (0.025)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	2.398*** (0.042)	1.574*** (0.060)	1.629*** (0.056)
Observations	43,595	25,266	24,324

Table A6: Attributions for Inequality by Nativity

	Dependent variable:			
	AFI - Discrimination		AFI - Motivation	
	GSS	Original I	GSS	Original I
1st Gen	-0.062^{***} (0.017)	-0.083^{***} (0.025)	0.084^{***} (0.017)	0.086^{***} (0.024)
2nd Gen	0.006 (0.026)	0.031 (0.043)	0.026 (0.026)	-0.067 (0.041)
3+ Gen	–	–	–	–
White	–	–	–	–
Asian	0.053^{*} (0.029)	0.080^{**} (0.033)	0.055^{*} (0.029)	0.038 (0.032)
Black	0.139^{***} (0.014)	0.149^{***} (0.030)	0.066^{***} (0.014)	-0.034 (0.029)
Latino	0.078^{***} (0.016)	-0.020 (0.032)	0.077^{***} (0.017)	0.069^{**} (0.031)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.036^{***} (0.007)	0.018^{***} (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)
Female	0.021^{**} (0.010)	0.093^{***} (0.022)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.080^{***} (0.021)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–	–
HS Grad	-0.044^{***} (0.017)	0.004 (0.045)	-0.078^{***} (0.017)	0.008 (0.044)
Some College	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.043)	-0.153^{***} (0.017)	0.030 (0.041)
College Grad	0.086^{***} (0.019)	0.028 (0.045)	-0.297^{***} (0.019)	-0.008 (0.043)
Post Grad	0.124^{***} (0.020)	0.020 (0.050)	-0.308^{***} (0.020)	-0.003 (0.048)
Strong Dem	–	–	–	–
Weak Dem	-0.145^{***} (0.016)	-0.057^{*} (0.032)	0.095^{***} (0.016)	-0.004 (0.031)
Lean Dem	-0.081^{***} (0.017)	0.009 (0.040)	0.034^{*} (0.017)	-0.049 (0.038)
Ind	-0.247^{***} (0.016)	-0.175^{***} (0.031)	0.126^{***} (0.016)	0.066^{**} (0.030)
Lean Rep	-0.384^{***} (0.019)	-0.240^{***} (0.048)	0.187^{***} (0.019)	0.208^{***} (0.046)
Weak Rep	-0.380^{***} (0.018)	-0.290^{***} (0.039)	0.235^{***} (0.018)	0.171^{***} (0.038)
Strong Rep	-0.462^{***} (0.019)	-0.322^{***} (0.036)	0.305^{***} (0.019)	0.307^{***} (0.035)
Income	X	X	X	X
Constant	0.677^{***} (0.026)	0.707^{***} (0.054)	0.342^{***} (0.027)	0.201^{***} (0.052)
Observations	9,530	2,120	9,490	2,120
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A7: Black and White Hardworking by Nativity

	Dependent variable:		
	Black Hardworking		
	ANES	GSS	Original I
1st Gen	−0.251*** (0.048)	−0.157*** (0.040)	−0.092*** (0.034)
2nd Gen	−0.060 (0.042)	−0.141** (0.064)	0.010 (0.058)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	−0.193*** (0.075)	−0.147** (0.069)	0.041 (0.046)
Black	0.738*** (0.039)	0.473*** (0.034)	0.375*** (0.041)
Latino	−0.090** (0.041)	−0.191*** (0.039)	0.111** (0.044)
Age	−0.004 (0.006)	−0.018*** (0.007)	−0.062*** (0.009)
Female	0.121*** (0.023)	0.051** (0.023)	−0.012 (0.030)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	0.048 (0.053)	0.200*** (0.040)	−0.037 (0.062)
Some College	0.147*** (0.051)	0.349*** (0.041)	−0.026 (0.059)
College Grad	0.249*** (0.054)	0.434*** (0.045)	−0.035 (0.061)
Post Grad	0.293*** (0.057)	0.496*** (0.047)	−0.002 (0.068)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	−0.420*** (0.040)	−0.165*** (0.038)	−0.257*** (0.044)
Lean Dem	−0.221*** (0.041)	−0.083** (0.041)	−0.109** (0.054)
Ind	−0.439*** (0.042)	−0.186*** (0.038)	−0.340*** (0.042)
Lean Rep	−0.571*** (0.043)	−0.292*** (0.045)	−0.325*** (0.066)
Weak Rep	−0.690*** (0.042)	−0.327*** (0.042)	−0.440*** (0.054)
Strong Rep	−0.599*** (0.037)	−0.355*** (0.044)	−0.321*** (0.050)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	4.477*** (0.068)	4.012*** (0.063)	2.733*** (0.073)
Observations	14,053	10,567	2,115

	Dependent variable:		
	White Hardworking		
	ANES	GSS	Original I
1st Gen	0.127*** (0.045)	0.311*** (0.038)	0.107*** (0.034)
2nd Gen	0.001 (0.038)	0.043 (0.061)	−0.273*** (0.058)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	−0.266*** (0.069)	−0.134** (0.066)	−0.196*** (0.045)
Black	−0.266*** (0.036)	−0.069** (0.032)	−0.239*** (0.041)
Latino	−0.180*** (0.038)	−0.053 (0.037)	−0.115*** (0.043)
Age	0.069*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.006)	−0.016* (0.009)
Female	0.040* (0.021)	0.001 (0.022)	−0.147*** (0.029)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	0.048 (0.049)	−0.119*** (0.039)	−0.134** (0.061)
Some College	0.050 (0.047)	−0.148*** (0.039)	−0.137** (0.058)
College Grad	−0.027 (0.050)	−0.168*** (0.043)	−0.179*** (0.060)
Post Grad	−0.068 (0.052)	−0.174*** (0.045)	−0.041 (0.067)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	−0.046 (0.037)	0.003 (0.037)	−0.121*** (0.043)
Lean Dem	−0.067* (0.038)	0.069* (0.039)	−0.143*** (0.053)
Ind	0.004 (0.038)	−0.011 (0.036)	−0.161*** (0.041)
Lean Rep	0.108*** (0.040)	0.085** (0.043)	0.097 (0.065)
Weak Rep	0.178*** (0.039)	0.107*** (0.041)	−0.028 (0.053)
Strong Rep	0.386*** (0.035)	0.279*** (0.042)	0.083* (0.049)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	4.474*** (0.063)	4.239*** (0.060)	2.619*** (0.072)
Observations	14,047	10,593	2,119

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A8: Latino and Asian Hardworking by Nativity

	Dependent variable:		
	Latino Hardworking		
	ANES	GSS	Original I
1st Gen	0.105** (0.052)	0.057 (0.077)	0.007 (0.033)
2nd Gen	0.022 (0.046)	−0.356** (0.154)	0.0005 (0.057)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	−0.099 (0.084)	−0.155 (0.126)	0.080* (0.044)
Black	0.362*** (0.042)	0.392*** (0.067)	0.200*** (0.040)
Latino	0.619*** (0.045)	0.325*** (0.073)	0.333*** (0.043)
age	−0.037*** (0.007)	−0.069*** (0.013)	−0.038*** (0.009)
Female	0.041 (0.025)	−0.018 (0.043)	−0.003 (0.029)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	0.034 (0.056)	−0.010 (0.088)	0.024 (0.060)
Some College	0.138** (0.054)	0.048 (0.088)	0.036 (0.057)
College Grad	0.145** (0.058)	−0.010 (0.094)	0.013 (0.059)
Post Grad	0.112* (0.061)	0.005 (0.095)	0.043 (0.066)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	−0.182*** (0.044)	−0.145** (0.073)	−0.048 (0.043)
Lean Dem	−0.153*** (0.045)	−0.092 (0.077)	−0.016 (0.052)
Ind	−0.336*** (0.046)	−0.190*** (0.071)	−0.213*** (0.041)
Lean Rep	−0.215*** (0.048)	−0.158* (0.086)	−0.138** (0.063)
Weak Rep	−0.255*** (0.047)	−0.282*** (0.081)	−0.073 (0.052)
Strong Rep	−0.118*** (0.042)	−0.175** (0.079)	−0.090* (0.048)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	5.188*** (0.074)	5.392*** (0.128)	2.657*** (0.071)
Observations	10,859	3,408	2,117

	Dependent variable:	
	Asian Hardworking	
	ANES	Original I
1st Gen	0.072 (0.051)	0.019 (0.032)
2nd Gen	0.069 (0.044)	0.012 (0.055)
3+ Gen	–	–
White	–	–
Asian	0.492*** (0.083)	0.380*** (0.043)
Black	0.135*** (0.040)	0.138*** (0.039)
Latino	0.202*** (0.043)	0.219*** (0.041)
age	0.024*** (0.007)	−0.006 (0.008)
Female	0.032 (0.024)	0.015 (0.028)
Not HS Grad	–	–
HS Grad	0.062 (0.055)	−0.028 (0.058)
Some College	0.308*** (0.052)	0.023 (0.055)
College Grad	0.427*** (0.056)	0.062 (0.057)
Post Grad	0.426*** (0.059)	0.083 (0.064)
Strong Dem	–	–
Weak Dem	−0.155*** (0.042)	−0.052 (0.041)
Lean Dem	−0.136*** (0.044)	0.017 (0.051)
Ind	−0.194*** (0.044)	−0.181*** (0.039)
Lean Rep	−0.108** (0.046)	0.002 (0.062)
Weak Rep	−0.197*** (0.045)	0.005 (0.050)
Strong Rep	0.002 (0.041)	−0.070 (0.046)
Income	X	X
Constant	4.877*** (0.071)	2.512*** (0.069)
Observations	10,922	2,116

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A9: Racial Problems Rare by Nativity

	Dependent variable:		
	Racism Rare		
	CES 18	CES 20	CES 22
1st Gen	0.193*** (0.024)	0.245*** (0.024)	0.171*** (0.026)
2nd Gen	0.001 (0.020)	0.045** (0.021)	0.034 (0.021)
3+ Gen	–	–	–
White	–	–	–
Asian	−0.033 (0.035)	−0.101*** (0.034)	−0.175*** (0.036)
Black	−0.110*** (0.019)	−0.098*** (0.019)	−0.087*** (0.018)
Latino	−0.084*** (0.022)	0.025 (0.021)	−0.048** (0.022)
age	−0.043*** (0.003)	−0.033*** (0.003)	−0.040*** (0.003)
Female	−0.238*** (0.011)	−0.232*** (0.011)	−0.268*** (0.011)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–
HS Grad	−0.038 (0.034)	−0.032 (0.038)	−0.008 (0.035)
Some College	−0.114*** (0.034)	−0.139*** (0.038)	−0.107*** (0.035)
College Grad	−0.173*** (0.035)	−0.206*** (0.039)	−0.144*** (0.036)
Post Grad	−0.241*** (0.036)	−0.319*** (0.040)	−0.211*** (0.037)
Strong Dem	–	–	–
Weak Dem	0.321*** (0.018)	0.360*** (0.019)	0.324*** (0.019)
Lean Dem	0.042** (0.019)	0.045** (0.019)	−0.016 (0.020)
Ind	0.700*** (0.018)	0.923*** (0.018)	0.808*** (0.018)
Lean Rep	1.374*** (0.020)	1.779*** (0.021)	1.585*** (0.022)
Weak Rep	1.116*** (0.020)	1.410*** (0.021)	1.180*** (0.021)
Strong Rep	1.402*** (0.017)	1.877*** (0.017)	1.609*** (0.017)
Income	X	X	X
Constant	2.019*** (0.040)	1.947*** (0.043)	2.140*** (0.041)
Observations	42,338	42,456	42,508
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A10: Perceptions of Discrimination by Nativity

	Dependent variable:			
	anti-White Discrim	anti-Black Discrim	anti-Latino Discrim	anti-Asian Discrim
	ANES	ANES	ANES	ANES
1st Gen	−0.208*** (0.033)	−0.164*** (0.035)	−0.122*** (0.033)	−0.123*** (0.041)
2nd Gen	−0.047* (0.028)	0.005 (0.030)	−0.005 (0.029)	−0.037 (0.036)
3+ Gen	–	–	–	–
White	–	–	–	–
Asian	−0.063 (0.051)	0.130** (0.054)	−0.027 (0.052)	0.334*** (0.058)
Black	−0.126*** (0.026)	0.551*** (0.028)	0.251*** (0.026)	0.080** (0.035)
Latino	−0.201*** (0.028)	0.184*** (0.029)	0.283*** (0.028)	0.159*** (0.036)
age	−0.011** (0.004)	−0.017*** (0.005)	−0.031*** (0.004)	−0.022*** (0.005)
Female	0.023 (0.016)	0.111*** (0.016)	0.103*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.019)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–	–
HS Grad	−0.120*** (0.036)	0.036 (0.038)	−0.029 (0.037)	−0.070 (0.050)
Some College	−0.183*** (0.035)	0.097*** (0.036)	0.025 (0.035)	−0.072 (0.048)
College Grad	−0.358*** (0.037)	0.194*** (0.039)	0.073** (0.037)	−0.068 (0.049)
Post Grad	−0.434*** (0.039)	0.255*** (0.041)	0.112*** (0.039)	−0.087* (0.051)
Strong Dem	–	–	–	–
Weak Dem	0.104*** (0.027)	−0.317*** (0.029)	−0.225*** (0.027)	−0.208*** (0.034)
Lean Dem	0.098*** (0.028)	−0.189*** (0.029)	−0.130*** (0.028)	−0.126*** (0.034)
Ind	0.366*** (0.028)	−0.573*** (0.030)	−0.381*** (0.029)	−0.281*** (0.035)
Lean Rep	0.518*** (0.029)	−0.915*** (0.031)	−0.690*** (0.030)	−0.485*** (0.035)
Weak Rep	0.436*** (0.029)	−0.844*** (0.030)	−0.647*** (0.029)	−0.495*** (0.035)
Strong Rep	0.607*** (0.025)	−1.010*** (0.027)	−0.839*** (0.026)	−0.556*** (0.030)
Income	X	X	X	
Constant	2.259*** (0.046)	3.713*** (0.049)	3.521*** (0.047)	3.079*** (0.060)
Observations	13,991	14,018	14,003	9,413
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.2 second-generation Results

In this section, I present results for the second-generation dummy variable from the body of the paper. second-generation immigrants of all racial and ethnic groups generally have racial attitudes that are indistinguishable from their third+ generation co-ethnics. In the cases where second-generation attitudes differ, they do not differ in any consistent direction across all racial/ethnic groups as do first-generation attitudes.

Figure A7: Second-Generation Immigrant vs Third+ Generation Racial Attitudes



Figure A8: Second-Generation Immigrant vs Third+ Generation Hardworking Ratings



Figure A9: Second-Generation Immigrant vs Third+ Generation Discrimination Perceptions

B.3 Country Optimism Scale

B.3.1 US Optimism Individual Questions

In this section, I present differences between immigrants and their native-born co-ethnics on each of the four questions that comprise the US Optimism scale. On all four questions, immigrants are more optimistic than native-borns. The smallest difference between immigrants and native-borns is in the "work hard, decent income" question, though immigrants are still significantly more optimistic when the data is pooled across all racial/ethnic groups.

Figure A10: US Optimism by Individual Questions



Notes: Immigrants are consistently more optimistic about the US than are native-borns on all 4 questions asked.

B.3.2 US Optimism and Racial Attitudes

The relationship between US Optimism and Racial Attitudes presented in Figure 6 is consistent with the other racial attitudes variables asked on Original Survey I, as presented below. Higher scores on the US Optimism scale translate to more negative attitudes toward Black Americans

Figure A11: US Optimism and Work Way Up



Notes: Immigrants and native-borns of all four groups who score higher on the US Optimism scale also score higher on the racial resentment workway measure.

Figure A12: US Optimism and AFI - Discrimination



Notes: Immigrants and native-borns of all four groups who score higher on the US Optimism scale are less likely to say that Black-white inequality is the result of anti-Black discrimination

Figure A13: US Optimism and AFI - Motivation



Notes: Immigrants and native-borns of all four groups who score higher on the US Optimism scale are more likely to say that black-white inequality is the result of Black Americans' lack of willpower or motivation

Figure A14: US Optimism and Black - White Hardworking



Notes: Immigrants and native-borns of all four groups who score higher on the US Optimism scale are more likely to rate whites as more hardworking than Blacks.

B.3.3 US Optimism and Racial Attitudes Regressions

Here, I present regressions that model the relationship between US Optimism and racial attitudes seen in Figure 6 and Appendix Figures A11 - A14. In all five regressions, the relationship between US optimism and negative attitudes toward Black Americans persists even after including control variables.

Table A11: US Optimism and Racial Attitudes

	Dependent variable:				
	Workway	Racial Resentment	AFI - Discrim	AFI - Motiv	Black - White HW
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
US Optimism	0.243*** (0.015)	0.166*** (0.011)	−0.042*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	−0.112*** (0.016)
Immigrant	0.048 (0.063)	0.041 (0.047)	−0.048** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	−0.236*** (0.066)
native-born	–	–	–	–	–
White	–	–	–	–	–
Asian	0.079 (0.083)	−0.031 (0.062)	0.099*** (0.032)	0.024 (0.031)	0.412*** (0.087)
Black	−0.157** (0.079)	−0.370*** (0.059)	0.150*** (0.031)	−0.027 (0.030)	0.842*** (0.083)
Latino	−0.068 (0.081)	−0.069 (0.060)	0.008 (0.031)	0.037 (0.030)	0.447*** (0.085)
age	0.004** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.00001 (0.001)	−0.005*** (0.002)
Female	−0.146** (0.057)	−0.103** (0.042)	0.076*** (0.022)	−0.062*** (0.021)	0.150** (0.060)
Not HS Grad	–	–	–	–	–
HS Grad	−0.059 (0.118)	−0.052 (0.088)	0.023 (0.046)	−0.010 (0.044)	0.248** (0.123)
Some College	−0.162 (0.112)	−0.123 (0.084)	0.011 (0.044)	0.009 (0.042)	0.241** (0.117)
College Grad	−0.376*** (0.117)	−0.279*** (0.087)	0.038 (0.045)	−0.025 (0.043)	0.272** (0.122)
Post Grad	−0.278** (0.129)	−0.293*** (0.097)	0.035 (0.050)	−0.022 (0.048)	0.135 (0.136)
Strong Dem	–	–	–	–	–
Weak Dem	0.032 (0.084)	0.192*** (0.063)	−0.054* (0.033)	−0.011 (0.031)	−0.186** (0.088)
Lean Dem	−0.036 (0.102)	0.107 (0.077)	0.001 (0.040)	−0.036 (0.038)	0.023 (0.107)
Ind	0.415*** (0.080)	0.556*** (0.060)	−0.175*** (0.031)	0.080*** (0.030)	−0.273*** (0.084)
Lean Rep	0.751*** (0.123)	0.829*** (0.091)	−0.229*** (0.048)	0.200*** (0.046)	−0.548*** (0.129)
Weak Rep	0.658*** (0.101)	0.807*** (0.076)	−0.275*** (0.039)	0.161*** (0.038)	−0.546*** (0.106)
Strong Rep	1.011*** (0.094)	1.126*** (0.070)	−0.299*** (0.036)	0.284*** (0.035)	−0.527*** (0.098)
Income	X	X	X	X	X
Constant	1.681*** (0.163)	1.385*** (0.121)	0.938*** (0.063)	−0.055 (0.061)	0.748*** (0.170)
Observations	2,054	2,042	2,054	2,054	2,048
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.3.4 Native Country Optimism and Racial Attitudes

In Figure A15, I examine the relationship between country of origin optimism and racial resentment. In the body of the paper, I documented a strong positive relationship between US optimism and racial resentment. Figure A15 shows no consistent relationship between native country optimism and racial resentment.

Figure A15: Native Country Optimism and Racial Resentment



Notes: There is no consistent relationship between Native Country optimism and racial resentment.

B.4 Original Survey II and Survey Experiment

B.4.1 Replication of Figures 2-8 Using Original Survey II

In Figure A16, I plot the difference between immigrants' and native-borns' racial attitudes. Due to a data issue which precluded the collection of some demographic variables, the regressions contain only age and party ID as covariates. The results are generally consistent with the findings in Figures 2-4, though the nativity effect on hardworking ratings in this dataset appears to be null.

In Figure A17, I plot the US Optimism ratings (analogous to Figure 5 in the body of the paper), and the relationship between US Optimism and racial resentment (Figure 6). Both plots are very similar to their Original Survey I analogues.

In Figure A18, I conduct a mediation analysis similar to the one conducted in the body of the paper. Again, due to a data collection error, the only available covariates are age, party ID, and race/ethnicity. The results of this mediation analysis are similar to those in Figure 8.

Figure A16: Difference between Immigrants and Native-Borns (Original Survey II)



Figure A17: US Optimism and Racial Attitudes (Original Survey II)

Immigrant and native-born US Optimism



Relationship between optimism and racial resentment



Figure A18: Nativity, US Optimism, and Racial Attitudes Mediation (Original Survey II)



B.4.2 Hardworking Mediation and Experiment Results

In Figure A19, I plot the results of the mediation and survey experiment analysis for the Black Hardworking - White Hardworking variable. While the mediation analysis shows a clear relationship between US Optimism and Black - White Hardworking, this relationship is not reflected in the experiment results.

Figure A19: Mediation and Experiment (Black - White Hardworking)



B.4.3 Subgroup Analysis Survey Experiment

While the survey experiment data is not sufficiently powered to detect subgroup effects, I conduct an analysis to determine whether the magnitude and direction of the subgroup effects are consistent. In Figure A20, I find several patterns.

Asian American and Latino respondents have generally similar responses to the survey prime, as do immigrants and native-borns. All four groups almost always respond in the same direction, with an effect of comparable magnitude. However, Asian Americans tend to have stronger responses on average than Latinos, especially to the Racial Resentment questions.

Figure A20: Survey Experiment Subgroup Effects

A) Racial Attitudes



B) Discrimination